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ABSTRACT. The radical constructivist assertion that the student constructs his or her 
own knowledge as opposed to receiving it 'ready made' echoes the classical debate as to 
whether the human subject constitutes the world or is constituted by it. This paper shows 
how the philosophical traditions of post-structuralism and hermeneutic phenomenology 
offer approaches to effacing this dichotomy and how this forces a re-assertion of the 
teacher's role in the student's constructing of mathematical knowledge. It is also shown 
how hermeneutic phenomenology provides an opportunity to ground constructivist 
mathematical thinking in the material qualities of the world. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Platonic notions of mathematical knowledge that see mathematics as having  'a real, 
objective existence in some ideal realm' (Ernest 1991, p.29), untarnished by human 
intervention, have contributed to the particularly high academic prestige it enjoys. In this 
perspective, mathematics has an order and consistency disturbed only by the frontiers of 
research revealing yet further uncovered domain. This image, however, despite its 
aesthetic appeal, has been challenged by assertions about the 'fallibility' of mathematical 
knowledge (e.g. Ernest, 1991, pp. 15-20). It also has limited usefulness in debates 
concerned with the acquisition by humans of this knowledge. The platonist view has been 
largely responsible for the tradition of seeing mathematics as a body of knowledge to be 
discovered or encountered by the student. This body, if not defined by the Gods, is put in 
place by some collection of experts and so is determined outside the consciousness of any 
individual learner. This view of mathematics tends to be associated with metaphors such 
as 'delivering', 'receiving' and 'ready made', being used in relation to teaching, learning 
and content.  
 
Radical constructivism (e.g Von Glasersfeld, 1991) offers a view antithetical to 
Platonism. According to this view the failure of more traditional mathematics teaching is 
a consequence of people believing that knowledge can be transferred ready made. The 
task for the radical constructivist teacher is to set tasks and to create an environment 
conducive to the student constructing his or her own meanings. The opposition between 
radical constructivist and platonist views on learning echoes the classic debate which 
questions whether the human subject constitutes the world in which he operates or is 
constituted by it. It is precisely this dichotomy that has been effaced by post-structuralist 
and hermeneutic writings. This paper considers the radical constructivist perspective in 
the light of these two modern philosophical traditions. 
 
In the next section I will demonstrate how the radical constructivist position is stressing 
just one side of this dichotomy.  Further I shall argue that these writers are downplaying 
the role of the teacher in asserting that the child's learning takes place through making 
constructions. I will suggest that the teacher inevitably contributes some degree of 'ready 
madeness' to any learning situation he or she sets up in the structuring of any activity. 
 
In the following two sections I will outline aspects of post-structuralism and hermeneutic 
phenomenology and show how they offer alternative accounts of the philosophical 
context within which radical constructivism resides1. I will discuss how post-
structuralism places primacy on the fitting of linguistic and symbolic forms to experience 
and follow Walkerdine (1988) in showing how this offers a productive view of how 
mathematical learning takes place. Here the human subject and the world in which he or 
she operates, are seen as being part of each other. In this way the question as to whether 
the subject constitutes the world or vice versa is transcended. I then discuss how 
hermeneutic phenomenology tackles this point by offering the possibility of a view of 
mathematical knowledge where hard distinctions between subjective and objective 
knowledge are removed. I will show how this provides an opportunity to introduce an 
ontology (i.e. a theory of how things are) that complements radical constructivist 
principles. This is achieved by placing more emphasis on the notion of 'mathematical 
activity' than on 'mathematics' and by seeing the elements of 'objective knowledge' as 
being activated by an individual learner classifying the phenomena he or she sees. I then 
further develop my suggestion that the mathematical expressions of a student within a 
classroom are not so much 'constructions' in their own right but rather elements in a 
dialogue between teacher and learner consequential to the teacher framing a certain 
structure.  
 
 
2. THE RADICAL CONSTRUCTIVIST IDEOLOGY:  THE STRESSING OF THE 
CONSTITUTIVE 
 
Radical constructivist writings have given a great deal of attention to how children learn. 
Very often this is accompanied by suggestions as to how teaching might facilitate this 
view on learning. For example, Steffe (1991, p.178) quotes Sinclair who suggests that 
from a constructivist point of view ‘the essential way of knowing the real world is not 
directly through our senses, but first and foremost through our material or mental 
actions’. Such a description of the acquisition of mathematical knowledge, whilst, 
presumably, being applicable to all learning, activates definite implications for teaching 
style. It is in the light of this description that Steffe suggests teacher's goals consistent 
with such a description of learning, including for example; 'to learn how to communicate 
mathematically with students, to learn how to organise possible mathematical 
environments, to learn how to foster reflection and abstraction in the context of goal 
directed activity, to learn how to encourage students to communicate mathematically 
among themselves.'  
 
It seems to me there is a need for care in moving from epistemologies to 
recommendations for practice. Captured in this particular way, the teacher's role within 
mathematics lessons is consistent with the emphasis being on the student constructing 
meaning. In the debate as to whether the cognizing subject is constituted or constitutive, 
the radical constructivist view emphasises the latter resulting in a ideologically selective 
account where both the environmental effects on the constructions students make and the 
teacher's role as environmental manager contained within these effects are insufficiently 
described. Such environmental management, however, is evident throughout the 
descriptions offered of constructivist teaching styles. This arises, firstly, in framing the 
mathematical activity in language and, secondly, in setting up the physical and social 
frameworks within which this happens.  
 
I suggest the framing of the mathematical tasks and the accommodating environmental 
design in lessons described by radical constructivist writers is such that the 'ready 
madeness' which they apparently wish to reject, is already highly developed before the 
student is invited to engage in constructive activity. The mathematical components within 
any curriculum are culturally defined resulting in the building blocks of any construction 
being in place before the child joins in. By providing such a frame these writers are 
offering different aspects of the task to that which might be offered by more traditionalist 
writers. Even in such a traditional teaching regime the learning would, in the eyes of a 
constructivist, be the result of the student making constructions2. The constructivist 
teacher then, may be seen as emphasising the constructive component of the child's 
learning that would arise in any style of teaching. 
 
This can perhaps be best illustrated by an example. Kaput (1991 p.63) cites the example 
of the problem of finding the general formula for the sum of the first n consecutive 
integers. He suggests a few methods including the representation of numerical tables and 
Cuisenaire rods as representations prior to formulation in algebraic notation, which he 
has used in 'both didactic teacher-centred lessons as well as in laboratory classes'. His 
account is of a highly structured presentation targeting a particular conclusion. Clearly, 
such an approach results in the students constructing meaning but within a very specific 
framework. An alternative formulation presented by Billington and Evans (1987) 
broadens the scope of the activity. Here the problem is posed in terms of counting the 
number of handshakes when all of the people in a room each shake hands with each 
other. The task in each of these presentations may be seen as leading to the result: 
 
     Sum of first n consecutive integers = n(n+1)/2 
 
However, there are a variety of routes there, each providing a different context for the 
production of the final result, and thus a different meaning for the statement. Kaput 
targets the activity at the production of this result and towards this builds a tight 
framework which restricts possibilities for the introduction of descriptive language by the 
student within which mathematical expressions can arise. Billington and Evans seem 
rather more concerned with the journey there and place emphasis on other mathematical 
aspects of the activity such as: processing information, making predictions, symbolising, 
tabulating, finding and investigating patterns, seeing connections, generalising, 
establishing a proof. In my own work with students on initial teacher education courses I 
have set the problem as a group task concerned with creating an illustrative poster to 
describe the nature of the problem to a friend who did not witness the actual handshaking. 
In all of these situations the task for the student is to make sense of the task and make 
statements in respect of it. The final algebraic relationship is a reductive outcome of this 
activity whose meaning depends on the nature of the reduction and the experience of 
making this reduction. 
 
For the teacher setting up such a task there is a need to decide on the style of posing the 
task and the structuring of the task this creates for the student tackling it. To maximise 
the achievement of a particular result requires a higher degree of structuring on the part 
of the teacher and a lower contribution in terms of framing the problem by the student. 
The formulation and solution of any problem can be seen as a joint action by teacher and 
student, composed of (from the student perspective) a 'ready made' part contributed by 
the teacher and a student construction made in respect of it. However, the resulting space 
provides components and offers a frame for what follows and so on. Similarly, any 
student construction is, in a sense, 'ready-made' for the teacher to work with. This is an 
issue raised by Wheatley (1992). Such a view moves away from a mechanistic cause and 
effect model in the teacher-student relationship.  
 
I suggest that the constitutive argument of the radical constructivist view can be resisted 
by an alternative argument assuming the opposite side of the same debate. This argument 
asserts the existence of the environment, and the teacher's constructions within this, 
acting on the student's developing understanding.  This apparent opposition, however, 
can be transcended. Post-structuralism and hermeneutics offer alternative ways of 
achieving this. 
 
 
3. POST-STRUCTURALISM 
 
Post-structuralism has not featured prominently in writings on mathematics education but 
has instead asserted an affinity towards the humanities and the broader field of the social 
sciences. Utilising as it does, Saussurian linguistics3, it has emerged from its roots in 
structuralism to establish itself as an independent movement. Its major exponents have 
been Derrida and Foucault. Lacan's psychoanalytical work offers a significant, but in 
some ways separate strand. Walkerdine (1984, 1988) has shown how such an approach 
can offer powerful ways of describing the learning of mathematics by young children.  
 
Structuralism, as a movement, has its origins in Levi-Strauss's work on the structure of 
myths in primitive societies. By collecting and analysing the myths of a particular society 
he identified common threads which emerged, providing some sense of an essence of the 
society to non-members. In this way, Levi Strauss argued that it was possible to locate 
and describe some objective structure underlying the mode in which the society operates. 
Such a model, however, suggesting a fixed relation between object and meaning, tends to 
underplay the differences between individual perspectives of this. More recent post-
structuralist models have sought to accommodate the possibility of personal 
interpretations of this structure. In so doing, however, they undermine the very existence 
of the structure. This shift from seeing some objective underlying structure to seeing a 
structure dependent on the perspective of the observer offers a paradigm for considering 
mathematical activity. Instead of seeing mathematical activity as containing elements 
with fixed objective meaning we move to seeing it as a situation featuring social usage of 
symbols. Here any meaning is dependent on the way in which the individual user intends 
it and on how this is interpreted by others.  
 
The theoretical framework used in analysing these issues owes much to Saussurian 
linguistics which also lends itself readily to the more specific context of mathematical 
learning. According to Saussure (1966, pp. 65-70), working at the turn of the century, the 
'signifier' is the word or image and the 'signified' is the associated concept, which, as a 
pair, form what he calls a 'sign'. However, a third element is implied, although not 
explicitly identified by Saussure; namely, the 'referent' or object itself4.  
 
We can perhaps illustrate it more clearly by reference to an example. The word 'dog' (the 
signifier) we associate with a certain concept (the signified) and on occasions we might 
encounter a 'real' dog (the referent) with which we can associate this sign. Even in this 
simple case, however, there are two sorts of arbitrariness present. Firstly, the word 'dog' 
is quite arbitrary and does in fact change according to the language being spoken. French 
people use the word 'chien'. Secondly, the category 'dog', is no more than an arbitrary 
grouping according to certain selected characteristics somewhere on the continuum 
starting at 'animal', passing through 'mammal', 'canine', 'spaniel' to 'Fido'. The sign 'dog' 
can be seen as being associated with a 'real' referent. However, not all referents are real in 
this sense. The signifier 'learning' for example, gives rise to signifieds and referents 
which are rather more problematic. Mathematical terms offer similar difficulties. 
 
Saussure was more concerned with the differences between signs rather than with their 
association with the material world. As such, signs were not seen as having meanings in 
themselves but rather derived meaning from their relation to other signs. The meaning of 
a word is thus dependent on the way in which it is used in a sentence. He saw the sign as 
unstable in the sense that the signifier and signified can move in relation to each other. 
For example, the signifier 'omnibus' has become 'bus' whilst the signified is in some sense 
unchanged, i.e. a vehicle capable of carrying a number of people. Similarly, 
pronunciation might change both geographically and chronologically. Conversely, the 
phenomena signified by the signifier 'Pythagoras' has shifted through time5. Meanwhile, 
the relationship of the complete sign with the referential field is arbitrary until it becomes 
a convention through socially consistent usage. Barthes sees certain signifying practices 
as becoming 'naturalised' in to what he calls myths. Such myths become embedded in 
ideological descriptions, creating reality for those who hold that ideological position. 
This is discussed by Coward and Ellis (1977, chap.3). School mathematics, for example, 
features a particular way of classifying mathematical activity in to components and 
procedures that themselves become 'mathematics' in the eyes of the clients. 
 
Mathematics, characterised as a language, necessarily comprises some system of 
signification but the relationship between the signified and the referent requires some 
unfolding. Mathematical phenomena do not have a real existence and any meaning is 
derived purely through relations perceived between these phenomena. Lacan has offered 
a new reading of Saussure where the signifier has primacy over the signified and a more 
fundamental instability between them is asserted6. Essentially, Lacan asserts that  
notation as printed on a page or held in a spoken word has more stability than that to 
which it refers. In perceiving some phenomena I can capture this in a description 
employing symbols. This symbolisation however, once fitted, and held in a material form 
as notation on a page, affects the way in which the phenomena is dealt with subsequently 
and also mediates any subsequent change in this symbolisation.   
 
Walkerdine has pointed out that Piaget's reading of Saussure resulted in him using the 
terms 'signifier' and 'signified' but in a very different way to Saussure himself and in a 
radically different way to the later meaning asserted by Lacan. She says (Walkerdine 
1988 p.3): 
 
'For Piaget the relationship of signifier to signified is one of representation; the semiotic 
function 
 
'consists in the ability to represent something (a signified something: object, event, 
conceptual scheme, etc.) by means of a signifier which is differentiated and which serves 
only a representative purpose. (Piaget, quoted in Gruber and Voneche 1977:489)'' 
 
Such a view is more akin to the older form of structuralism (and Piaget's (1971) reading 
of it) with its implied fixed relations between object and meaning, independent of any 
individual observer. Piaget's work is widely acknowledged as underpinning 
constructivism but Lerman (1989) argues that radical constructivism asserts itself as a 
distinct movement to Piaget's genetic epistemology  by affirming its commitment to the 
notion that coming to know 'does not discover an independent, preexisting world outside 
the mind of the knower'. Von Glasersfeld (Watzlawick 1984, p.25), in addressing this 
issue, suggests that 'Piaget's position is somewhat ambiguous.' In post-structuralism, and 
in particular, in Lacan's version of this, words are not mere labels, but rather the tools 
with which reality is constructed and held in place. 
 
Any field of mathematical symbolisation is a consequence of the mathematical qualities 
of the world being perceived in some way and then being classified within the categories 
of a language. 'Square', for example, is a socially conventional signifier associated with 
the concept 'square' but we never actually have a real square. Consider the commands: 
 
     Draw a four sided regular polygon in pencil. 
     Write REPEAT 4 [FD 100 RT 90] in LOGO. 
 
The signified 'square' is evoked by each of these but the referred to 'square', as defined in 
geometry, is not physically present and never can be. It can only be imagined. The 
referent here might be seen as the Lacanian 'objet petit a'; that is the 'lack' encountered 
after stripping away the various layers of description (e.g. Zizek, 1989, p.95, Brown et al, 
1993). Such a post-structuralist position would emphasise the play of meaning held in the 
various descriptions and would be disinclined to see meaning produced outside of these 
descriptions. Squareness is a quality that may be seen as being within the physical world 
but it only comes into being retroactively as part of a human naming (signifying) process. 
The name 'square' is merely an arbitrary label given to a repeatable idea seen as being 
worthy of having a name to itself. However, whilst the notion may not have a physical 
reality, pursuit of it can govern actions. Althusser's suggests that something is real if 
people say it is and act as if it is (Hirst and Wooley, 1982, p.134). 'Square' is a human 
construct that shapes our way of describing the world and our acting within it. 
 
The generation of statements made in respect of mathematical activity is, necessarily, a 
human classifying process concerned with the selection and combination of signs. 
Walkerdine (1988) describes these as 'discursive practices' concerned with the building of 
categories and the 'production' of meaning. In this way, mathematical writing can be seen 
as comprising statements, associated by the writer with what they see as circumscribed 
mathematical ideas. This process of producing such writing is concerned with associating 
signifiers with signifieds where both the arbitrary elements identified by Saussure are 
present, but where social convention necessarily exerts some influence. Walkerdine 
suggests that developing mathematical understanding can be seen as the initiation of 
students into the socially conventional ways of associating linguistic and symbolic forms 
with phenomena seen as mathematical7. This might be seen as learning the local myths. 
The ontological qualities of these very phenomena, however, is uncertain. Lacan would 
see the symbolic expressions themselves as becoming the material reality of these 
phenomena. 
 
The fitting of a signifier, however, does have a holding effect on the signified resulting in 
a materially stable notation being associated with a conceptualised phenomena, subject to 
contextual and chronological changes. To provide an example I shall refer to a lesson 
where ten year old children were investigating the interior angles of polygons. Having 
done a few examples they had concluded that for three sided shapes the total was 180o, 
for four sided shapes, 360o and for six sided shapes, 720o. On this basis they made the 
hypothesis: 
 
 'For five sided shapes the total degrees is 540o' 
 
This expression was being used to hold a hypothesised relationship. They then proceeded 
to make five sided shapes out of wooden 'pattern blocks'. Each time an appropriate shape 
was made they attempted to sum the angles, employing a variety of techniques for 
measuring individual angles. However, they made numerous slips in measuring angles 
and in counting the total, reaching many totals that were not 540. However, the holding 
effect of the hypothesis was such that they were prepared to reject other results and re-
check by other methods. After an hour they had three examples of five sided shapes 
where they felt the total was 540o. They saw this as adequate proof of the hypothesis and 
when asked the total for ten sided shapes were quickly able to give a convincing figure. 
This was followed by the production of a ten sided shape (two touching hexagons) with 
the angles marked and adding to the expected total. 
 
I would suggest that the expression, whilst materially stable, was associated with an idea 
whose meaning shifted during the course of this activity. The expression was initially 
simply the sentence that filled the gap in the sequence 180, 360, ..., 720. It then 
proceeded to be the story associated with the three examples of five sided shapes. In the 
light of this it was seen as sufficient confirmation of the pattern to justify projecting 
forward to more sophisticated shapes.  
 
Another important aspect of the use of expressions is the self-referential qualities they 
possess. The fitting of any expression is dependent in the first place on the position and 
perspective of the subject making an association. The children in the example above are 
selecting the key expressions which for them epitomise the situation they are observing. 
They are mapping out their enquiry in a very personal way. Their quest may be to fit an 
ever more exact form but the very fitting of the form materially affects the context of 
which the phenomena is part, thus affecting the position and perspective of the subject 
fitting this form. In this way other expressions may emerge as holding the essence of their 
work.  
 
The subject's attempts to fit symbolic forms to particular phenomena are also deeply 
rooted in his or her perspective of how the phenomena relates to him or her. The child 
learns to position him or her self in the world before he or she has learnt to speak. 
However, there remains a residue of this pre-linguistic state as the child captures ever 
more of his or her world in language. In this way the subject perceives part of him or her 
self in fitting any symbolic form to phenomena which are necessarily seen from an 
individual perspective. The act of fitting any form has a reflexive dimension where, 
simultaneously, the form signifies both the perspective of the subject and the meaning of 
the phenomena to him or her. In this way the quest to find the most appropriate form is in 
part concerned with self description. However, the final description of this  subject-in-
context is always in the future since any attempt at closure always affects that described. 
Zizek (1989, chap.6) argues that this thwarted attempt at reaching some concluding 
position is always in hand with a failure on the part of the subject to constitute him or her 
self (in language). The story told by the children about their work on angles is never 
finished, since as their work proceeds the meaning of the expressions they use forever 
shift as the perceived context for them changes.  
 
Similarly, any form of mathematical instruction introduced by a teacher conceals a 
socially conventional way of making associations between symbolic forms and 
phenomena seen as mathematical.  Walkerdine (1984), following Foucault’s work, has 
argued that much that went under the banner 'child-centredness' was to do with covert 
regulation, by asserting conventional forms of signification as 'natural'. This is also 
certainly true of the 'neo-child centrists' among the constructivists. Within a child-centred 
philosophy the child is engaged in constructing meanings and so in the development of 
signifying practices. Expressions are being fitted to phenomena towards producing 
meaning. However, this constructing arises in an environment where certain conventional 
discourses prevail and the task becomes to fit inherited forms in a conventional way as 
represented by the teacher or published scheme. In this way, the constructions are 
controlled but in an environment described as if the child is responsible controlling the 
agenda. 
 
When the constructivists talk of student's constructing they underplay the fact that this 
constructing is being done in an inherited language associated with a conventional way of 
using it. The ready-madeness they wish to reject is necessarily implicit in the language 
teacher and child use in communicating with each other. Also, in framing any activity for 
the child, the teacher is selecting the particular domain of discourse that further 
contextualises and thus conditions any terminology used. Conventional mathematical 
discourse has classified mathematical phenomena in a particular way that is arbitrary in 
both of the ways identified by Saussure. The same is true of the procedures employed in 
respect of these phenomena insofar as there are conventional ways of tackling certain 
sorts of tasks (e.g. the decomposition method for subtraction problems). In this way 
learning mathematics is akin to learning a language, but not so much as a system and 
structure but rather as it is realised in individual everyday acts.  
 
Walkerdine (1988) takes account of this more in her alternative (post-structuralist) 
reading of how children learn mathematics by placing more emphasis on the actual fitting 
of words and symbols to experience. Here meaning is produced as the student develops 
signifying practices. Brown (1990) provides an example of this with an investigational 
task where a variety of alternative forms (e.g. drawings on squared paper, models made 
out of plastic squares, algebraic symbolisation) are fitted by student to various lattice 
arrangements. He suggests that meaning is produced through the student making and 
combining metaphoric associations (e.g. between a drawing on squared paper and its 
plastic equivalent) and metonymic associations (e.g. between two plastic models). The 
sense that the student makes of this situation is held in the stories he or she tells about it.  
 
In summary, post-structuralism moves away from seeing the world as something 
constructed by the individual human subject by recognising that this is always done in an 
inherited language. The chief consequence of this is that a style of structuring is already 
implicit in the conventional ways of describing the world that teacher and child find 
themselves obliged to use in facilitating communication between them. This is not only 
true of the phenomena seen as being components of mathematics but also of the 
procedures applied to these. This is not inconsistent with radical constructivism but 
places a firmer emphasis on language and on the role of the teacher as representative of 
the dominant discourse. It also provides a clearer connection with the much broader field 
of post-structuralism as it has been developed in respect of other areas within the social 
sciences.  
 
Whilst post-structuralist writers do offer views on materiality (see for example, Coward 
and Ellis, 1977, p.127) I shall not pursue these within this paper. I will however, now 
address how writers in hermeneutic phenomenology tackle this issue and so provide a 
possibility of an ontology consistent with radical constructivism. 
 
 
4. HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 
 
Radical constructivism (e.g. Von Glasersfeld, 1991) explicitly avoids entering into 
theories about how things are. According to this view there may or may not be some 
independently existing reality, but whatever the case the cognizing subject does not 
discover such a reality directly. Cognizing is seen as an adaptive process and the subject 
is in search of a viable but forever renewable model, generated through his or her 
perceiving of and acting in the world.  Critics (e.g. Kilpatrick, 1987) have identified a 
weakness here and suggest that there is a need for ontological issues to be addressed 
more explicitly in setting up an epistemological framework, towards making a firmer 
connection with reality. I will argue here that by using notions of objectivity derived from 
phenomenology, a theory of how things are can be introduced without undermining the 
constructivist theory of how we know (e.g. Noddings 1990, Von Glasersfeld, 1990). 
 
Post-structuralism asserts that the meaning of any situation is held in the play of accounts 
offered in respect of it, where there is no truth outside that constructed in these accounts. 
Hermeneutics, the theory and practice of interpretation, however, holds on to the notion 
that there might be an ultimate truth but that this cannot be accessed directly. This truth is 
always conditioned by the process through which it is seen.  Hermeneutics thus readily 
lends itself to the disciplines within the human sciences, which in general,  'deal with the 
world of meaningful objects and actions (as opposed to physical objects and events in 
themselves' (Culler, 1976), where the human subject is assumed to have a particular 
position and perspective rather than some God-like overview. The phenomenological 
underpinning implicit in such a view of the human sciences has been highly influential in 
the development of modern hermeneutic thinking. Here I shall outline how 
phenomenology and its development within hermeneutics can offer a useful framework 
for considering mathematical learning.    
 
 
Action and meaning 
 
In his ‘Philosophical Investigations’ Wittgenstein (1958, p.20) suggests that the meaning 
of a word might be seen as its usage in language and is thus dependent on both situation 
and time. This offers an alternative to seeing words as having inherent meaning and a key 
to analysing expressive activity as action. To say a sentence is to perform an action. The 
meaning of a sentence, seen as an action, can then be seen as being related to the 
description of its effect, in a social situation (Thompson 1981, p.126).  Ricoeur (1981, 
p.210), a leading exponent of modern hermeneutics, sees this effect, the way the action 
leaves its mark, as the ‘objectivity’ of the action. He follows Husserl, the founder of 
modern phenomenology, in seeing objectivity and subjectivity in a more complementary 
relationship with each other.  
 
If the production of any mathematical expression can be seen as an action, the meaning of 
such an expression is necessarily subject to an interpretation that transcends any meaning 
in the expression itself. We need to look at how the expression is being used by someone 
in a particular context. A distinction needs to be drawn between ‘mathematics’ (as might 
be perceived in a Platonic sense) and ‘activity seen as mathematical’. In doing this, the 
stating of any mathematical expression, verbally or in writing, can be seen as an action 
subject to interpretation. The meaning of this action, would therefore go beyond that 
which would be found in a purely literal or symbolic investigation and cannot be 
separated from its agent or the context in which it arises.  
 
To unfold this idea Ricoeur (1981, p.199) concurs with Austin (1962) in suggesting that 
the effect of a sentence might be described at three levels; a) the locutionary effect, (the 
literal meaning), b) the illocutionary effect, (what is construed through tone of voice, 
perceived context etc.) and c) the perlocutionary effect, (the action done by the sentence). 
Ricoeur suggests these levels form a hierarchy according the degree of interpretation 
needed. The locutionary meaning can be checked in a dictionary. To describe the 
perlocutionary meaning, however, requires the subject to have experience of living in an 
appropriate  language using community and to be accustomed to fitting words to given 
situations in a conventional way. 
 
  
Husserl’s phenomenology 
 
Ricoeur (1966) has done substantial work in developing Husserl's writing on 
phenomenology and offers an alternative approach to tackling the constitutive/constituted 
debate. He does this by seeing subject and object as part of each other; the individual is 
always part of what he or she sees. For example, in handling some practical mathematics 
apparatus I am finding out about myself. The apparatus is only meaningful insofar as it 
resists and guides my actions. The apparatus and my body become unified in any action. 
 
In asserting subject and object  as part of each other Ricoeur softens yet maintains the 
distinction  between them. He speaks of any action as having reciprocal 'voluntary' and 
'involuntary' components. The voluntary component gives rise to the involuntary 
component which has no independent meaning but rather can be seen as the immediate 
context, or the resistance, which gives the voluntary component its meaning. The 
involuntary shapes itself around the voluntary act. This implies a (hermeneutic) process 
where the subject voluntarily acts in the world he or she  supposes it to be, but this in turn 
gives rise to (involuntary) resistances which are always at some distance from those 
anticipated. However, in order to act the subject suspends doubt whilst acting as if his or 
her reading is correct.  
 
In his detailed discussion of Ricoeur’s work, Thompson (1981, p.128) identifies this 
aspect of his work as dealing with the constitutive/constituted dichotomy. 
 
‘For Ricoeur’s attempt to understand the reciprocity of the voluntary and the involuntary 
is a systematic attack on the dualism of an autonomous self-consciousness exiled from an 
objective world which it regards as an other. Ricoeur pursues this attempt through a 
detailed demonstration of how each moment of the will comprises both a voluntary and 
involuntary aspect, the ultimate unity of which remains an unattainable ideal.’   
 
A key notion in Husserl’s phenomenology is that of ‘intentionality’.  In seeking to clarify 
this notion Schutz (1962) asserts: 
 
‘There is no such thing as thought, fear, fantasy, remembrance as such; every thought is 
thought of , every fear is fear of, every remembrance is remembrance of, the object that is 
thought, feared, remembered.’ 
 Similarly,  Ricoeur asserts that a consciousness is always a consciousness of something. 
This is not to say that the subject is conscious of a discreet object which it sees as the 
other, but rather  
 
'the basic datum of experience at its most immediate level is the intentional unity of 
subject and object from which both the concept of a pure subject and of a pure object are 
subsequently derived by reflexive consciousness' (Ricoeur, 1966,  p.xiii).  
 
My understanding of this is that I might talk about the situation I see myself in, as if it 
were independent of me, after experiencing myself as part of it. I experience myself 
'acting' through time but I am unable to talk about this as it happens. In my subsequent 
descriptions however, I can speak of 'actions', facts after the event, which can be 
classified in language after reflection. It is in such a description, made in hindsight,  that I 
am able to describe myself as if I am separate to the situation I am in.  
 
Zizek in his lengthy discussion of Lacan’s psychoanalytic work (1989, pp 11-14) locates 
a similar notion. Referring to Freud’s work on dreams he distinguishes between the 
dream, the memory of the dream and the recounting of the dream in words. The meaning 
of the dream cannot be captured as it happens, but rather some retroactive categorisation 
is necessary to prepare it for description in language. I am very much a part of the dream 
as it happens and I need to reflect  subsequently in order to make sense of it. This 
reflective process results in myself, and the world of which I am part, being described in 
language, providing an orientation to the world I have experienced through my senses. As 
another example, Zizek (1991, p.100) identifies the Marxist notion of  ‘class struggle’ as 
a ‘structuring principle’ around which we can orientate social phenomena we have 
experienced through historical processes. In mathematical activity concerned with 
making sense of certain situations we are confronted with a similar task of introducing 
structures around which we can orientate our thinking. By introducing successive 
linguistic and symbolic overlays the various aspects of our work within an activity can be 
examined through the ‘stressing and ignoring process’  implied, without which ‘we 
cannot see anything’ (Gattegno, 1971, p.11). 
 
Ricoeur uses Husserl's notion of 'bracketing'  where the existence of objects, and relations 
between them are assumed and fixed for the time being so that consciousness is directed 
towards 'phenomena', that is, objects having certain meanings to an individual person at a 
given time.  According to Ricoeur  (1966, p.xiii-xiv), 
 
‘(T)here is no consciousness unless it is consciousness of an object-and, conversely, an 
object presents itself as an object only for a consciousness....  by imposing the 
phenomenological brackets we transform the contents of experience from a physical 
world of objects into a world of phenomena, that is objects as meanings presenting 
themselves to a consciousness'. 
 
Coward and Ellis (1977, p.132), in discussing Husserl’s work, suggest 
 
‘.. phenomenology disputes the so-called ‘natural attitude’, the existence of the external 
real world. It is not concerned with the spatio-temporal existence of things, such concerns 
are simply bracketed out: if it is real to consciousness, then it is real.’8 
 
 
Objectivity 
 
Gadamer (1962, p.220) quotes Husserl who asserts that such phenomenological 
developments displace traditional notions of objectivity where it is seen as the antithesis 
of subjectivity. 
 
‘The naivete of talk about ‘objectivity’ which completely ignores experiencing, knowing 
subjectivity, subjectivity which performs real concrete achievements, the naivete of the 
scientist  concerned with nature, with the world in general, who is blind to the fact that all 
truths that he acquires as objective, and the objective worlds itself that is the substratum 
in his formulation, is his own life construct that has grown within him, is of course, no 
longer possible when life comes on the scene’  
 
Phenomenological views offer the opportunity for providing a clearer ontological 
grounding for action. Whilst the independent existence of the material world, prior to any 
classification and outside of individual consciousnesses is not denied, the world of 
material objects existing, in a fixed way, independently of an individual consciousness, is 
denied. My ability to distinguish shapes, colours, smells, textures, objects is dependent on 
my senses, is culturally conditioned, and emerges through time. The material is only 
describable within linguistic categories to an individual consciousness and any 
description is the result of an interpretation. In particular, the meaning of an action, that 
is, its objectivity, is related to how it is described in retrospect. The voluntary action 
brings in to play involuntary resistances that only have any meaning in subsequent 
descriptions of their effect. Meaning is dependent on the categories we introduce and 
objectivity is a function of describable traits.9 As an example of this Brown (in press) 
uses particular traits identified by Ricoeur to analyse the status of a transcript recording 
some children working together in a mathematics lesson 
 
Objectivity within hermeneutic phenomenology emerges through an interplay between 
the experiencing of the world and making statements in respect of it. Whilst my 
experiences lead to me describing them in a particular way, these descriptions I offer 
condition the way in which I subsequently experience things. My experiences are 
mediated by language. Here objectification is a consequence of a reflexive process where 
notions, and relations between them, are bracketed (i.e seen as phenomena and assumed 
for the time being), and through this bracketing, regulate the way in which the world is 
described. In a sense the objective world can only be seen through successive linguistic 
overlays; or rather, particular time-dependent partitionings. The way in which I 
experience the world governs the way I talk about it. The way in which I talk about the 
world, however, now informs the way in which I see it in the future. This circularity is an 
embodiment of the two arcs of the hermeneutic circle, from understanding to explanation 
(i.e. from understanding the world through a process of categorising it, to making 
constructions in language in respect of it) and vice versa (Ricoeur, 1981, pp.210-
221).This sort of recognition underlies hermeneutic understanding which has been 
discussed in relation to mathematical activity by Brown (1991). Seen in this way 
'objectivity' is not synonymous with 'intersubjectivity', which appears to be the case in 
certain constructivist writings. 
 
 
The hermeneutics of classroom experience 
 
In a field not noted for its simplicity Gallagher (1992, pp.34-39) provides a remarkably 
lucid account of how hermeneutics offers a powerful way of considering classroom 
experience. He suggests that writers in hermeneutics have generally been too concerned 
with text interpretation and this has blinded them from the general applicability of the 
approach within the field of education. He identifies classroom and play experience as 
being similarly valid objects for hermeneutic analysis. For Ricoeur (1981) text 
interpretation is not about re-joining the author and the meaning of the text is more 
dependent on what the reader brings to it. Similarly, Gallagher suggests that learning is 
not about replicating the ideas of the teacher. Rather it is more appropriate to see the 
learner’s experience as a sequence of interpretations made in respect of the classroom 
situation. The hermeneutic circle can be seen here as the interplay between these 
interpretions and taking actions in respect of them.   
 
Any act of constructing by a child in a mathematics lesson can be seen as part of an event 
that is at the same time modifying the environment for this action. The action, which 
comprises voluntary and involuntary components, has agent and structure as part of each 
other. For example, the production of a mathematical expression by a student, a voluntary 
action, would be complemented by the structure (the source of the involuntary 
resistances), part of which may have been constructed by the teacher in response. The 
event thus comprises a shared action seen from different perspectives. For some outside 
observer looking on, a 'shift of attention' (Mason & Davis, 1990) may be required in 
switching from seeing the joint action as one of the child constructing, to one of the 
teacher asserting some framework within which this arises - from constitutiveness to 
constitutedness. 
 
As an example, I shall describe a recent observation of a seven year old girl working with 
Dienes blocks. Five children and a teacher were seated around a table covered with a 
wide variety of base 10 material. After a period of 'free-play' the girl was directed 
towards counting the number of unit cubes in a 10x10x10 cube. She declared that she 
knew that on one face there were 100 unit cubes. She then proceeded to count the number 
of faces and concluded that since there were six faces there must be 600 cubes altogether. 
The teacher's response was to pick up a 10x10 'flat' and ask how many would be needed 
to make the big cube. The girl started piling one flat upon another and counted as she did 
this. After saying 'five hundred' she grinned broadly recognising that the result was not 
going to be 600. She went on to conclude that there were 1000 cubes. The girl was 
subsequently able to give two accounts of how to calculate the total yet seemed unable to 
reconcile them. She opted for the latter result primarily because her teacher had nudged 
her there. 
 
Whilst engaging in this activity the girl was making 'constructions' of various sorts. Her 
work during the free-play interlude seemed to have her engaging in a variety of voluntary 
tasks defined by herself. The environmental resistances included; the obligation to stay at 
the table, the suggestion that the materials be used in a certain way, the other children's 
use of the materials, the framing of the activity consequential to the physical properties of 
the materials, the verbal guidance of the teacher. These resistances shaped themselves 
around the voluntary actions of the girl.  
 
The more specific guidance of the teacher, towards counting the unit cubes in the 'block', 
served to re-orientate the girl's gaze redefining for her the phenomenological structure of 
her perceptual field. For the girl it seemed the solution was to be found in the 'block' itself 
as, in the first instance, she made no reference to the other pieces available. She seemed 
to count those cubes that were visible to her in taking such a perspective and 
consequently decided that there were 600. However, once the teacher became aware of 
this and introduced the possibility of counting by using some of the other pieces available 
her gaze was again re-directed so that the 'flats' were used in a particular way towards 
constructing the 'block'. Any other potential use of the 'flats', however, was being ignored 
for now. 
 
The selection of, and the meaning assigned by the girl to, the various pieces was 
consequential to the framing of them by the teacher. The child was without doubt making 
constructions but component 'objects' within these constructions were suggested in the 
teacher's actions which stressed and ignored certain qualities. The pieces were not being 
seen as 'units', 'flats' and 'blocks' in themselves but as phenomena which had certain 
meanings in relation to each other, in the eyes of the girl. The successive overt actions of 
the child and teacher suggested a space for the other to work in. This space, in being 
interpreted in particular ways, gave rise to intentional actions made in respect of the 
individually perceived phenomenological field. The interlude can thus be described as a 
jointly created sequence of actions where both teacher and child construct but in a way 
responsive to the jointly created environment within which this happens. 
 
In summary, there are two key implications for radical constructivism. Firstly, by 
introducing such a notion of objectivity an ontological position rooted in the material 
world can be introduced that at the same time allows for the possibility of an individual 
constructing meaning. The material existence of the world is fully accepted but it only 
presents itself according to some particular phenomenology subsequent to being carved 
up in some time dependent categorisation by an individual. Secondly, acknowledgement 
can be given to the teacher's contribution to the joint process of constructing, necessarily 
implicit in any teacher/learner exchange. Any assertion of a 'mathematical' domain is an 
assertion of a culturally bound form of structuring. In the example above, the task of 
'counting the unit cubes in the big cube' is as much a negotiation about the language to be 
used as a problem employing conventional mathematical terminology. As in the post-
structuralist reading, the teacher, in asserting the conventional structuring is demanding 
that the child's constructions be made using socially constructed building blocks. The 
teacher is thus complicit in any construction by the child.     
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In recognising that mathematics does not have a reality outside of its symbols and the 
meanings humans bring to these we are faced with a difficulty in framing the precise 
nature of the mathematical object. When considering issues of learning by individual 
students, however,  we can be more productive if we brush aside notions of mathematics 
as created by the Gods, or at least by the experts.  Radical constructivism moves firmly in 
this direction.  However, as a consequence of placing too much emphasis on the notion of 
students constructing their own meaning the radical constructivists are underplaying the 
role of (the inherited) language and the framing implicit in the teacher's setting up of a 
mathematical activity. Post-structuralism, in many ways, complements radical 
constructivism but in emphasising the constituted aspect of children's learning insists on a 
higher profile being given to linguistic issues. Seeing mathematics in this way, social 
conventions govern mathematical behaviour through having naturalised certain signifying 
practices. Learning mathematics can then be seen as learning to employ a language where 
certain conventional forms and procedures are inherited.  
 
In doing this, however, the post-structuralist position radically redefines notions of the 
human subject. This subject, and the situation of which he or she is part, are both 
constructed in language, in the sense that they are held in the successive stories told about 
them. In being defined by these stories there is no stability about who this subject is since 
any description can always be extended. The subject can never be fully constituted since 
the closure of such descriptions is always in the future - another story can always be 
told10.  
 
By following phenomenological writers we can assert mathematics as that which is done 
within mathematical activity and so individual acts seen as mathematical can take 
primacy over an externally defined objective mathematical knowledge. The process of 
coming to know mathematics can be seen as classifying the experience of this activity 
into a certain order within language in individual consciousnesses. This presupposes a 
physical world that cannot be independent in any describable way since any description 
ties it to the perspective of an individual consciousness. By seeing objectification as the 
activation of phenomena, through the classifying of perception in language, by an 
individual, we can introduce an ontology supportive of  the constructivists' emphasis on 
individuals constructing meaning. 
 
By opting for constitutiveness and in so doing asserting an opposition between 
constitutiveness and constitutedness the radical constructivist position is losing an 
opportunity for such an ontological grounding. Their ideologically selective description 
of teaching emphasises those bits consistent with a constructivist view of learning. By 
asserting constitutiveness insufficient account is being made of the nature of the teacher's 
task and the way in which it supports learning. I have shown here that by transcending 
opposition between constitutiveness and constitutedness a broader account can be given 
of learning where teacher and learner engage in a dialogue comprising actions which can 
be simultaneously described as constructions by the teacher and learner that frame the 
space and provide the building blocks of successive actions by both. 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. The separation of these traditions is in some ways artificial since there is much cross 
fertilisation. However, many writers would assert the distinction for both philosophical 
and political reasons. 
 
2. This is discussed more fully by Pirie and Kieren (1992).  
 
3. 'Saussurian linguistics' is a rather ambiguous term. Saussure himself did not write a 
book on the subject, a task he saw as far too complex. The Course in General Linguistics 
was put together posthumously by his students compiling their lecture notes. Within 
modern linguistics Saussure is definitely associated with the past and has been 
superseded by many writers. However, within literary theory and other post-structuralist 
writings he is referred to more than any other linguist. Saussure's work was specifically 
targeted at the task of linguistics but subsequent readings have given his work status as a 
framework for all of the human sciences. Jackson (1992) has suggested that the Saussure 
who consorts with Derrida and Lacan is not the empirical linguist at all but rather an 
idealist philosopher of language invented in Paris in mid-century long after the real 
Saussure passed away. 
 
4. This third element is much more controversial and is discussed in detail elsewhere (e.g. 
Hodge and Kress (1988), Lacan/Wilden (1968) and Ellis (1989) offer varying 
perspectives).  
 
5. The name was originally associated with theories about number, but to many people 
now this name conjures up a particular geometrical relationship (Tahta, 1991). An 
interesting account of word usage within the social sciences, showing this instability, has 
been offered by Williams (1983).  
 
6. Lacan speaks of the signified sliding under the signifier and uses the metaphor of 
'points de capiton' (upholstery pins) in speaking of nodal points fixing the system of 
symbolisation in a 'quilting process'. This aspect of Lacan's work is discussed at length by 
Zizek (1989).  
 
7. These ideas can be traced through a debate continuing through a number of articles, in 
particular; Corran & Walkerdine (1981), Tahta (1985), Liebeck (1986), Pimm (1986) and 
in Pimm's (1991) review of Walkerdine (1988).  
 
8. For fuller accounts of Husserl’s phenomenology are offered by Schutz (1962, pp. 99-
149), Gadamer (1962, pp 214-234) and Pivcevic (1970). 
 
9. Thompson (1981, pp. 139-149) outlines a more developed theory of action.  
 
10. This is a definite move away from the subject implied by the Descartesian aphorism 
"I think there I am' where the subject is seen as a being in his or her self. 
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